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her rights, expressions of interest and con-
cern, and as an exercise of "reasonable
firmness" in meeting the McCray test.
They gave much weight to the counseling
undergone by the mother and her husband
with the Ohio agency, albeit on instruc-
tions from Chester County Children's
Services. The court rationalized that the
appellant mother was reasonably led to
believe that these sessions would preserve
her rights to her daughter.
The lower court's ruling that the grand-
mother and aunt were not acting on behalf
of the mother was found to be without
merit. Pennsylvania does not require that
a parent personally take care of a child,
and one may make reasonable arrange
ments for temporary care. In re Adoption
of Wolfe, 454 Pa. 550, 557, 312 A.2d
793, 797 (1973). The fact that the grand-
mother and aunt satisfied their own emo-
tional needs does not nullify the mother's
concern. The court said that the main
consideration is whether the mother rea
sonably relied on her family and whether
they were aware of the reliance. The
Court concluded that appellant's
testimony supported the arrangement.
The majority noted that the mother
continued to improve her environment,
culminating in the separation from her
husband, Melissa's stepfather, in order to
make it adaptable to the raising of a child.
Justice Roberts wrote a strong and ex-
tensive dissent, charging the majority
with misreading the record, erroneously
construing the standard of parental
responsibility required by the statute, and
arriving at findings not supported by the
record. He considered appellant's con-
tacts with Melissa to have been minimal
and found in the record that the counsel-
ing was unsuccessful. The record also
showed that appellant and her husband
denied any knowledge or responsibility
for Melissa's injuries, and that the Ohio
agency concluded that Melissa should not
be returned to the custody of appellant.
The dissent questioned appellant's sin-
cerity in wanting to separate from her
husband, noting that she never mentioned
that desire until the termination hearing,
and a mere two weeks before it she said
her address was in Ohio.
The minority also noted that in both
letters to Chester County Children's Serv-
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ices, the mother expressed her desire that
Melissa be returned to her, and that her
husband shared this wish. Justice Roberts
concluded that "the decree of the
Orphans' Court is supported by compe-
tent evidence. The decree granting the
petition to terminate appellant's parental
rights should be affirmed." Pyott, supra,
at -, 380 A.2d at 325.
Despite the minority's condemnatory
reading of the record, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court majority seems to find
failure or refusal to perform parental
duties only in the most blatant situations
of neglect. As the court stated in In re
Adoption of Farabelli, 460 Pa. 423, 333
A.2d 846 (1975), "Unless there is im-
pressive evidence either of inadequacy of
the natural parent to properly care for,
provide for, maintain and guide the child
or other compelling facts dictated to the
contrary, the relationship of parent and
child should not be disturbed by granting
custody of the child to a third party."
Obviously, the court saw the facts in
the Pyott case as less than impressive evi-
dence that Patricia Pyott Davis had
neglected her parental duties toward
Melissa, and that the tenuous contacts she
maintained with Melissa were sufficient to
preserve her parental rights.
It appears that Pennsylvania is follow
ing the parental right doctrine rather than
the presumptive right doctrine. Although
there is no direct mention in the opinion
regarding any emotional investment
Melissa may have made in her foster
parents in those sixteen months, Justice
Roberts alluded to it when he cited the
legislative intent behind the Adoption Act
that when "... the possibility exists for
the child to establish an effective parent
child relationship through adoption, the
parent-child relationship may be termi
nated." Pyott, supra at __, 380 A.2d at
320. However, even had the court con-
sidered Melissa's relationship with the
foster family and found the emotional in-
vestment substantial, it is unlikely that it
would have allowed termination. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been
unwilling to terminate a natural parent's
rights unless the record clearly shows
neglect or refusal to perform parental
duties. In re Adoption of Sarver, 444 Pa.




by Thomas G. Ross
When the management of the Sheraton
Park Hotel in Washington, D.C. first pro-
posed to improve its swimming pool
facility, they could not have envisioned
the eventual expense to the corporation of
that project. In 1968, the pool was equip-
ped with a three-meter, high performance
"Duraflex" diving board. Three years
later, an inexperienced diver, eighteen-
year-old Thomas Hooks, was propelled by
the board into shallow water where his
head was violently greeted by the pool's
floor, resulting in Hooks' quadriplegic
state.
Seeking to recover monetary damages
for his disability and medical expenses,
Hooks and his parents instituted a per-
sonal injury suit against the Sheraton con-
glomerate in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Their
suit alleged negligence on the part of the
defendant both in the operation and con-
struction of the pool.
In a bifurcated trial on the issues of
liability and damages, a jury found
Sheraton liable to the plaintiffs for
damages of $7,000,000. Following the
jury's verdict and a defense motion, the
trial judge ordered a new trial unless
Hooks and his parents remitted the excess
of $4,500,000 and $180,000 respec-
tively. The plaintiffs filed the required
remittiturs, and Sheraton appealed the
verdict.
I. LIABILITY
In its appeal for reversal of the jury
finding of liability, Sheraton contended
that the trial judge's instructions to the
jury on two negligence issues were im-
proper and prejudicial. In writing the
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unanimous opinion for the circuit court in
Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corpora-
tion, No. 76-1958 (D.C. Cir. decided Dec.
22, 1977), Judge Robb stated that both of
these arguments were without merit. No.
76-1958, slip op. at 5, 8.
The first argument posed by Sheraton
attacked the instruction given by the trial
judge on the hotelkeeper's duty of care.
The appellant argued that, contrary to ap-
plicable District of Columbia law, the dis
trict court instructed the jury in a manner
that required the Hotel to provide its
guests with an "absolute warranty of
safety." Id. at 3.
Sheraton contended that the law in the
District of Columbia has applied the
doctrine of implied warranty and cited the
authority of Bellevue, Inc. v. Haslup, 80
U.S. App. D.C. 181, 150 F.2d 160
(1945) (Per Curiam). See also, Picking v.
Carbonaro, 178 A.2d 428 (D.C. App.
1962). The court in Bellevue stated the
following rule as to the respective duties
of innkeepers and guests:
The landlord is liable for failure to use
reasonable care to keep safe such parts
of the premises as he may retain under
his control, either for his own use or for
the common use of the guests or ten-
ants in the hotel. Equally, it is the duty
of a tenant or guest to exercise ordinary
care for his own safety.
Bellevue, Inc. v. Haslup, 80 U.S. App.
D.C. at 182, 150 F.2d at 161.
Judge Robb indicates in his opinion
that the appellant based its argument
solely on the following sentence of the
trial court's instruction to the jury:
You are instructed that the owner or
the operator of a hotel warrants
(emphasis added) to its patrons that the
facilities of said hotel are safe for the
use by its patrons, free from defects or
dangerous designs, and that such
facilities can be used in the use and
manner for which they were intended
without danger or risk of injury and
that such facilities are reasonably fit
and suitable for their intended use.
Slip op. at 4.
In rejecting the contention that this
sentence may have been understood by
the jury "to mean that the hotel owed an
'absolute warranty of safety' to its
guests," the appellate court noted that
such an inference by the jury would have
been unreasonable considering the
totality of the instruction, i.e. the fact that
the trial judge offered seven pages of in-
structions on the issue of negligence to
the jury, as well as the trial court's ad-
monition to the jury that a hotelkeeper is
not the "insurer" of his guest's safety.
Slip op. at 4,5.
In its second allegation of error as to
liability, Sheraton addressed the trial
court's instruction on the doctrine of
negligence per se. The appellant main-
tained that no instruction on this doctrine
should have been given to the jury. Bas-
ing its contention on the District of Col-
umbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in H.R.H. Construction Corp. v. Conroy,
134 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 411 F.2d 722
(1969), Sheraton argued that it had made
the necessary explanation that "any
possible violations" of applicable D.C.
regulations were not inconsistent with its
exercise of due care. Id. at 5,6.
The court noted that, pursuant to the
Conroy ruling, the law in the District of
Columbia on the issue of a negligence per
se jury instruction is as follows:
This court drew a distinction between
cases in which the defendant offers no
explanation of a violation of a statute
or regulation and those in which the de-
fendant introduces evidence tending to
show that its failure to comply with the
statute or regulation is consistent with
the exercise of due care.
Slip op. at 6; See, e.g., Ross v. Hartman,
139 F.2d 14 (1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 790 (1944); Richardson v. Gregory,
281 F.2d 626 (1960); Hecht Co. v.
McLaughlin, 214 F.2d 212 (1954);
Karlow v. Fitzgerald, 288 F.2d 411
(1961).
At trial, the defendant had introduced
testimony of the Chief of the District of
Columbia Air and Water Quality, who had
approved the plans for the pool in 1960.
The court noted that this witness testified
only to the extent that the pool would not
have been licensed for operation unless it
had been constructed according to the ap-
proved plans; however, no testimony was
introduced to show that the pool was, in
fact, so constructed. Slip op. at 6,7.
The applicable D.C. regulations re-
quired a depth of ten feet directly below a
diving board and extending out for twelve
feet. After that, the requirement was that
the depth could be lessened at the rate of
one foot for every three feet of distance
from the board. Id. at 7.
The plaintiffs' evidence at trial showed
the following:
1. The approved plans indicated that
the pool would be equipped with a
wooden diving board, not the
aluminum "Duraflex" model;
2. The "Duraflex" board extended into
the pool five inches more than the
wooden one. the one included in the
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approved specifications for the pool;
3. The water level in the pool on the
day of the accident was several inches
low;
4. Several expert witnesses, including
the 1976 U.S. Olympic diving coach
and a college diving instructor, testified
that the "Duraflex" board was unsafe
for inexperienced divers because of its
greater "elasticity" and spring.
Slip op. at 7.
The appellate court agreed with the
trial court's instruction on negligence per
se, indicating in the opinion that Sheraton
had not met the test set by the court in
Conroy. The fact that the original plans
had been approved and the pool licensed
to operate by the District of Columbia did
not explain Sheraton's violation of the
city's regulation by its insertion of the
unapproved board, and the jury could
properly infer that this violation was in-
consistent with the hotel's duty of due
care.
II. DAMAGES
In arguing on appeal that the jury's
award to the plaintiffs was "grossly ex-
cessive" and that the remittiturs were un-
satisfactory, Sheraton objected on three
grounds. The appellate court refused to
consider the first two contentions, admis-
sion of evidence of estimated future infla-
tion and the allegation that the plaintiffs'
closing argument was inflammatory, in-
dicating that they were untimely objec-
tions which could not be initially raised in
the appellant's brief and motion for new
trial respectively. Judge Robb stated that
the arguments had been reviewed,
however, and that no plain error basis was
found. No. 76 1958, slip op. at 8,9.
As to Sheraton's third contention, the
court held this argument to be valid.
Judge Robb noted that the appellate court
may have reversed the trial court verdict
on this issue, and remanded the case for
new trial, had it not been for the required
remittiturs. Ruling that the sufficiency of
the remittiturs was "in conformity with
the interests of justice," the District Court
verdict was affirmed. Id. at 13.
The prejudicial error occurred when the
trial court ordered testimony of the plain
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tiffs' expert concerning the income tax
effect on Hooks' future earnings to be
stricken, and the judge instructed the jury
to disregard it.
In expanding its own holding in Runyon
v. District of Columbia, 150 U.S. App.
D.C. 228, 463 F.2d 1319 (1972), the
Circuit Court held that Hooks' income
taxes over his lost future career should
have been deducted by the jury in its
award. The Runyon decision involved a
wrongful death, the court there holding
that "the jury could award only the
amount available to the estate after
deducting taxes and the costs of mainte-
nance of the decedent and his dependen-
dants." 76-1958, slip op. at 9; See Run-
yon, 463 F.2d at 1320.
In his opinion for the court, Judge Robb
wrote:
We are unable to perceive any distinc
tion between death cases and personal
injury cases in computing lost future
earnings. ***That the estate in a death
case receives only a net amount after
taxes and expenses are deducted
whereas the personal injury plaintiff is
himself being compensated for his lost
future earnings is a distinction without
legal significance.
Slip op. at 9.
To complement the court's position on
the issue of damages, Judge Robb quoted
the following from McCORMICK, LAW OF
DAMAGES 560 (1935):
The primary aim in measuring damages
is compensation, ***damages for a tort
should place the injured person as
nearly as possible in the same condition
he would have occupied if the wrong
had not occurred.
Slip op. at 9.
In further argument on this issue, both
parties relied on a Second Circuit en banc
opinion, McWeeney u. New York, N.H. &
H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 870 (1960), which held that juries
should be precluded from considering the
effect of income taxes in determining
damages for middle and low income plain
tiffs.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court
was not persuaded by the reasoning in
McSweeney. There the court had
reasoned that the determination of future
tax liability was too speculative and con-
fusing for a jury, and that inflation factors
would equitably offset their recovery. In
Hooks, Judge Robb pointed to the fact
that the trial court had been more specific
by allowing the plaintiff to introduce evi-
dence of the effect of future inflation. The
court noted that expert testimony of
Hooks' "Hypothetical Career" was
"speculative" in itself, and that the most
serious factor, jury confusion, could be
minimized by "expert testimony, pre-
sented under the watchful eye of the ex-
perienced trial court." No. 76-1958, slip
op. at 10.
In concluding for the court, Judge Robb
wrote that even if the tax rate on Hooks'
lost future earnings was assumed to be as
high as 40%, testimony by the plaintiffs'
expert witness on economics concerning
Hooks' lost "career earnings" indicated a
maximum set-off of $450,000 in income
taxes. Since Hooks' remittitur amounted
to a greater savings by Sheraton, the
court determined that the appellant had
received sufficient compensation for any
error attributable to the trial court.
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